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INTRODUCTION
The 2013 term at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
was replete with a variety of important international trade law
decisions. As in past terms, the majority of cases addressed
challenges to antidumping orders and administrative review
processes. However, this term also included a significant case
pertaining to alleged discrimination within the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule.1 Another case involved a complaint by U.S. lumber firms
challenging the authority of the U.S. Trade Representative2 (USTR).
The court also addressed a unique First Amendment challenge to an
 Kevin J. Fandl is an Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and an Associate
Professor of Strategic Management in the Fox School of Business at Temple University.
He has taught as an Adjunct Professor at American University since 2005. He is an
attorney admitted to practice in New York, Massachusetts and Washington, D.C.;
Ph.D., in Public Policy at George Mason University; J.D., American University Washington
College of Law; M.A., American University School of International Service; B.A., Lock Haven
University; Fulbright Scholar. I would like to thank Amorie Rivera for her
outstanding research assistance with this article.
1. See Rack Room Shoes v. United States, 718 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(finding that the appellants did not plead facts sufficient to make a plausible claim of
discriminatory intent).
2. See Almond Bros. Lumber Co. v. United States, 721 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (holding that the U.S. Trade Representative has discretion to decide whether
compensatory trade benefits are satisfactory).
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antidumping order—arguing that a negative response to an
administrative questionnaire should not be used against a party in a
duty determination.3 Additionally, six classification cases provided
valuable insight into the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s
(“Customs”) discretion in identifying a proper tariff heading.
This Article is not organized in order of case significance, but
rather on the content of the opinions. The first Part focuses on
antidumping decisions—discussing ten precedential decisions. The
second Part addresses classification issues—providing an overview of
six precedential cases. The remaining two Parts address rule of
origin and procedural cases. While many unique issues were raised at
the Federal Circuit this term, the scope of the court’s review and its
deference to regulatory agencies was consistent with prior terms.
I.

PRECEDENTIAL ANTIDUMPING CASES

In Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. United States,4 the United States
had imposed an antidumping order on laminated woven sacks from
China at a countrywide rate of 91.73%.5 Zibo Aifudi Plastic
Packaging Co, Ltd. (“Aifudi”), an exporter subject to this rate,
applied to the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce) for a
separate rate—claiming that it was not subject to control by the
government of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”).6 Commerce
accepted Aifudi’s claim and established a preliminary separate rate of
64.28%.7 Aifudi then withdrew from the administrative proceeding
and asked that their confidential information submissions be
destroyed. Commerce subsequently determined that Aifudi was
subject to the country-wide rate because evidence no longer existed
in the record to justify a separate rate. The question in AMS
Associates, Inc. v. United States8 was whether unverified evidence should
be used by Commerce to justify establishing a separate antidumping
duty rate.9
In response to the request of Aifudi’s and others, Commerce
initiated an administrative review of the antidumping order for a
specific time period—naming Aifudi a mandatory respondent in the
3. See Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. United States, 734 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (holding that the court was bound by precedent to find that the Byrd
Amendment does not discriminate on the basis of a viewpoint).
4. 734 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1378.
7. Id.
8. 719 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
9. Id. at 1379.
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review.10 Aifudi provided both public and confidential answers to the
questionnaires along with documents it had not provided in the
original separate-rate finding.11
After receiving the responses, but prior to their verification,
Commerce made a preliminary determination that Aifudi was eligible
for a separate rate of only 0.68% due to an absence of control by the
Chinese government.12 Aifudi then withdrew from the review process
and asked Commerce to destroy all the confidential information
collected.13 Commerce complied and, finding Aifudi noncompliant,
assigned Aifudi the countrywide rate of 91.73%.14 Commerce used
Aifudi’s withdrawal as an adverse factor in assigning them the
countrywide rate.15
Following Commerce’s decision to apply the countrywide rate to
Aifudi, Shapiro Packaging, an importer of laminated woven sacks
exported by Aifudi, argued that the countrywide rate should not
apply to Aifudi based on the material provided to Commerce.16 In
reviewing Shapiro’s claims, the court applied a substantial evidence
standard to sustain the Court of International Trade’s (CIT) finding
that Commerce had properly found Aifudi did not carry its burden of
proving entitlement to a separate rate.17 According to the court,
evidence that the company at issue experiences neither de jure nor
de facto government control must be offered to rebut the
presumption of government control.18 Because Aifudi requested its
documentation to be destroyed, Commerce no longer possessed the
evidence required to rebut the presumption of government control.19
The court concluded that Shapiro’s argument that Commerce
should have used the unverifiable information was erroneous.20
Instead, under the relevant statute, Commerce was clearly directed
that when submitted “information cannot be verified . . . [it shall] use
the facts otherwise available.”21 The court held that Commerce

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1378–79.
15. Id. at 1379.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id. (noting that removal of Aifudi’s confidential information “left
Commerce unable to verify information that Aifudi had earlier provided in order to
establish its eligibility for a separate rate”).
20. Id. at 1380.
21. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(2)(D) (2012).
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properly applied the countrywide rate when the separate rate
information could not be verified.22
Though the First Amendment and antidumping laws rarely
converge at the CIT, in the case of Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. v.
United States, this is precisely what happened. Here, the question
presented to the court was whether a company’s right to free speech
was violated after it took a neutral or contrary position on an
International Trade Commission (ITC) antidumping questionnaire
given to domestic producers.23
Pursuant to a petition that the U.S. furniture manufacturers and
labor unions filed, Commerce began an antidumping investigation of
certain Chinese wooden bedroom furniture manufacturers.24 At the
same time, the ITC began investigating whether the domestic
wooden bedroom furniture industry had been harmed by unfair
import competition from China to determine if it needed to
distribute questionnaires in accordance with the Byrd Amendment
(now repealed).25
To aid in its investigations, the ITC sent
questionnaires to various domestic producers.26 The questionnaires
asked whether the domestic producer supported the petition.27
Ashley Furniture indicated opposition to the petition, while Ethan
Allen Furniture indicated that they took no position.28
The ITC nevertheless determined that there had been an injury
and prepared a list of affected domestic producers (“ADPs”) to
receive a portion of the antidumping duties.29 However, Ethan
Allen and Ashley Furniture were precluded from the list due to
their answers to the petition.30 The ITC based its decision on a
finding that neither was an “interested part[y] in support of the
petition” within the meaning of the Byrd Amendment.31 Both
parties brought claims, which were dismissed by the CIT for failure
to state a claim.32 Each party then appealed to the Federal Circuit
and the cases were consolidated.33 On appeal, both parties argued
22. AMS Assocs., Inc., 719 F.3d at 1380.
23. Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. v. United States, 734 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed.
Cir. 2013).
24. Id. at 1308.
25. Id. (referring to 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(a), (d)(1) (2000), repealed by Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 760(a), 120 Stat. 4, 154 (2006)).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1308–09.
30. Id. at 1309.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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that they had, in fact, supported the petition within the meaning of
the statute, or, in the alternative, that the Byrd Amendment violated
the First Amendment.34
The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT on all claims. First, the
court dismissed the First Amendment challenge35—agreeing with
the CIT that the issue was previously determined in SKF USA v.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection.36 SKF held that rewarding only
those producers who had supported an ITC petition did not
violate the First Amendment.37
The court also held that both Ethan Allen and Ashley
Furniture’s answers had not supported the petition under the
plain meaning of the Byrd Amendment.38 The majority rejected
the dissent’s argument that merely completing the questionnaire
was indicative of support—finding such a conclusion to be an “odd
construction” of the Amendment.39 Instead, the court found that
the statutory language requiring a producer to “indicate support”
was conclusive:
the answer in the domestic producer’s
questionnaire must show support.40
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Clevenger argued that merely
responding to the Commission’s questionnaire is indicative of
support. According to him, the question at issue was not meant to be
dispositive as to whether the domestic producer was an affected
domestic producer.41 Instead, the question, pre-dating the Byrd
Amendment, was whether the petition has been filed “on behalf of
the domestic industry” in accordance with § 1673a(c)(1)(A)(ii).42
Judge Clevenger concluded that Congress never intended the
support/oppose question to be a test for whether a producer might
receive Byrd Amendment distribution funds.43
Judge Clevenger also suggested that the majority’s construction of
the Byrd Amendment, which allowed for penalizing producers based
on their answers, posed serious constitutional problems.44 Thus, in

34. Id.
35. Id. at 1310.
36. 556 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
37. See id. at 1359–60 (explaining that the Byrd Amendment is within the
constitutional power of Congress to enact, furthers the government’s substantial
interest in enforcing trade laws, and is not overly broad).
38. Ashley Furniture, 556 F.3d at 1311.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1312 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1314.
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Judge Clevenger’s view, the Amendment should be construed so as to
avoid unconstitutional results.45
In another case of interpretation, the court addressed
Commerce’s use of the “constructed value” method for determining
dumping. Chevron deference will generally apply to Commerce’s
interpretation of antidumping statutes.46 In Atar S.R.L. v. United
States,47 the United States argued in support of Commerce’s
interpretation of the “constructed value” clause of the antidumping
statute.48 Commerce had issued an antidumping order on certain
pasta from Italy.49 In the ninth administrative review of the order,
Commerce assessed an antidumping duty margin of 18.18% for
Atar.50 In assessing the margin, Commerce found that it could not
assess a normal value and were required to use a constructed value
approach.51 Unable to use the first two statutory options for
calculating a constructed normal value, Commerce relied on the
last option, which allowed “any . . . reasonable method” to construct
a normal value so long as the profit used did not “exceed the
amount normally realized by exporters.”52
In order to construct a normal value, Commerce decided to assess
Atar’s margins by using the preferred method, which is “based on
actual sales of a foreign like product made in the ordinary course of
trade.”53 This information was integrated alongside a second
statutory option for constructing a value that used “the weighted
average of the actual costs incurred and profits realized by the other
exporters under review.”54 The distinction between the two sets of
data was that the information used for the “other exporters” was from
six companies identified in a prior administrative review, not the
review of Atar.55 Atar challenged the Final Result in the CIT.56
45. Id. at 1315.
46. See, e.g., Pesquera Mares Australes Ltda. v. United States, 266 F.3d 1372, 1381
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the antidumping proceedings conducted by
Commerce are entitled to Chevron treatment); Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus,
88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1284 (2008) (noting that Chevron deference is the
“presumption that Congress delegates interpretive authority to administrative
agencies when it commits regulatory statutes to agency administration”).
47. 730 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
48. Id. at 1326 (referring to 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (2006)).
49. Id. at 1322.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (noting that the provision in § 1677b(e)(2)(B)(iii) limiting the allowable
profit is also described as the “profit cap”).
53. Id. at 1323 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(2)(A)).
54. Id. at 1322 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
55. Id. at 1323.
56. Id.
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The CIT found Commerce’s decision to exclude below-cost sales
“arbitrary” and remanded for recalculation of the value.57 Commerce
then included the below-cost sales but limited the data used from the
prior administrative review to only those respondents who had
earned a net profit.58 The CIT remanded again.59 In its second
response, Commerce maintained its previous position regarding the
decision to use only respondents with net profits in its calculation.60
The CIT remanded a third time, reasoning that the use of only two
net-profit producers “heavily skewed Commerce’s weighted-average
profit cap figure” and failed to meet the statutory “profit-cap.”61 In its
third response, Commerce used all six respondent’s data, including
below-cost sales, resulting in an antidumping duty margin of
11.76%—the Government appealed.62
The Federal Circuit reversed the CIT’s decision and found
substantial evidence to support the reasonableness of the means that
Commerce used in calculating Atar’s normal value.63 Affording
Chevron deference, the court found Commerce’s decision to exclude
below-cost sales reasonable in light of the fact that it had partially
employed statutory option two,64 which normally requires the
exclusion of below-cost sales data.65
Finding that Congress had not barred exclusion of below-cost sales
data, the court held that the CIT had misread a Statement of
Administrative Action (“SAA”) provision by taking it out of context
and using it as a basis for remand.66 Concluding that the SAA
provision the CIT used was not the “unambiguously expressed intent”
of Congress, the court explained that it could not be used to
challenge Commerce’s claim.67 According to the court, Commerce

57. Id.
58. Id. at 1323–24.
59. Id. at 1324.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1325.
63. Id. at 1326.
64. Id. at 1326–27.
65. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012). As indicated by the Statement of
Administrative Action (“SAA”), accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act,
“with regard to option (ii), the consideration of below-cost sales of a foreign producer’s
competitors could allow that producer to ‘benefit perversely from its own unfair pricing.’”
Atar, 730 F.3d at 1327 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 103-316, at 840 (1994)).
66. Atar, 730 F.3d at 1328 (clarifying that the SAA provision allowed Commerce
to exclude below-cost sales).
67. See id. at 1329 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
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acted reasonably in its calculation, and the CIT should have deferred
to the Agency’s expertise on the matter.68
In Changzhou Wujin Fine Chemical Factory Co. v. United States,69 the
court determined that, absent reasonable justification, an Adverse
Facts Available (“AFA”) duty rate may not be calculated as a deterrent
or a punishment for cooperating respondents.70 The case involved an
antidumping investigation of 1-hydroxyethylidene, 1-diphosphonic
acid (“HEDP”) prompted by Compass Chemical’s filing of a petition.71
Quantity and Value (“Q&V”) questionnaires were sent to ten
exporters.72 Four of the ten responded along with a fifth voluntary
respondent.73 From the five responses received, the Wujin Water and
Kewei companies were chosen for individual investigation.74 While
Commerce assigned a single state-wide rate for all exporters and
producers involved in proceedings stemming from non-market
economy countries, including China, Wujin and Jiangsu filed for a
separate rate, both proving independence from state control.75
Commerce initially established a preliminary rate of 24.3% for
Wujin Water in the individual investigation.76 Kewei did not respond
and was assigned an AFA rate of 72.42%.77 Commerce set Kewei’s
rate as the China-wide rate applicable to all Chinese exporters and
producers that did not qualify for separate rates.78 Meanwhile, it
assigned Wujin Water’s rate as the rate applicable to Wujin and
Jiangsu in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(5)(A).79 Commerce

68. See id. (recognizing that antidumping determinations have long “involve[d]
complex economic and accounting decisions of a technical nature, for which
agencies possess far greater expertise than courts” (quoting Fujitsu Gen. Ltd. v.
United States, 88 F.3d 1034, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1996))).
69. 701 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
70. See id. at 1378 (stating that deterrence does not override the greater purpose
behind the AFA rate, which is to calculate the dumping margins as accurately and as
fairly as possible).
71. Id. at 1370.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. Commerce had originally found that BWA was one of the largest
exporters of HEDP from China based on the questionnaire responses; however, BWA
was ineligible to be individually investigated due to BWA’s refusal to permit public
disclosure of its supplier. Id. As a result, Commerce selected Wujin Water and Kewei
as the mandatory respondents. Id.
75. Id. at 1370–71.
76. Id. at 1371.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1370.
79. Id. at 1371. In dealing with non-market economies like China, Commerce
presumes that exporters and producers are state-controlled unless they prove
otherwise, and assigns them a state-wide rate. Id. at 1370. Here, because Kewei failed
to demonstrate its independence from state control, Commerce imputed Kewei’s
rate of 72.42% to the “China-wide entity” rate. Id. at 1371.
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justified the separate rate by distinguishing Jiangsu and Wujin from
the China-wide entities and by calculating their rate as a weightedaverage margin based on the experience of mandatory respondents,
excluding rates based on AFA.80
After Wujin submitted all of its supporting information, it was
found to actually have a de minimis rate and not the 24.3%
preliminarily assigned.81 Given this new information, Commerce
turned to § 1673d(c)(5)(B), which allowed it to “use any reasonable
method to establish the estimated all-others rate” applicable to those
exporters and producers who were not individually investigated.82
However, the appellants challenged the simple averaging of the de
minimis rate and Kewei’s AFA rate (36.21%) as being punitive
because it imposed a noncompliant AFA on a party who had acted in
full compliance with the investigation.83
The CIT remanded the case to Commerce to recalculate the
separate rate.84 In its recalculation of the AFA rate, Commerce
included Wujin’s verified normal data and U.S. price data obtained
from BWA Water Additives U.S. LLC (BWA), one of the five original
Q&V respondents.85 Although BWA was not part of the mandatory
investigation, it held the largest share of the HEDP market.86 BWA
was not chosen initially because it had refused to provide information
relating to its suppliers.87
Using the new data, Commerce determined that the AFA was
30.94% and, when averaged with Wujin’s de minimis rate, resulted
in a new separate rate of 15.47%.88 Wujin and Jiangsu challenged
Commerce’s usage of new U.S. price data in its recalculated
separate rate and claimed that this was beyond the scope of the
remand order.89

80. Id. at 1371. Commerce found that Jiangsu and Wujin had provided sufficient
evidence of their independence from state control and thus calculated their rate
separately pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1573d(c)(5)(A), which provides that those rates
should be calculated as “a weighted-average margin based on the experience of
mandatory respondents and excluding any de minimis or zero rates or rates based on
[AFA].” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 1-Hydroxyethylidene-1, l-Diphosphonic
Acid From the People’s Republic of China, 73 Fed. Reg. 62,470, 62,473 (Oct. 21,
2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id. at 1371–72.
82. Id. at 1372 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(5)(b) (2006)).
83. Id. at 1372.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1373.
86. Id. at 1370.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1373.
89. Id. at 1373–74.

FANDL.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

1384

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/23/2014 2:28 PM

[Vol. 63:1375

On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the usage of new U.S.
price data did not go beyond the scope of the remand order.90
However, the court held that the reasoning behind the recalculation,
although supported by substantial evidence, was arbitrary and
capricious.91 Regarding the facts, such as the usage of one company’s
data over another’s, the court employed the “substantial evidence”
standard.92 Regarding the actual reasoning used, the court applied
the “arbitrary and capricious” standard.93
The court found that it was reasonable for Commerce to abandon
the data it had originally used in light of the fact that it could not be
verified.94 However, it rejected the Government’s argument that
imposing an AFA rate was required to serve a deterrent purpose.95
Central to the court’s reasoning was its explanation that “deterrence
is not a sufficient justification when calculating a rate that solely
affects cooperating respondents.”96
It reiterated that simple
averaging is acceptable, but the usage of a rate created only to deter a
cooperating respondent is not permissible.97
Lastly, the court found the Agency’s reasoning arbitrary and
capricious when, in accordance with law, the “overriding purpose of
Commerce’s administration of antidumping laws is to calculate
dumping margins as accurately as possible.”98 The court did not
agree with the Government that the AFA statute requires some AFA
rate for general deterrence purposes; instead, the court found that
AFA rates are statutorily disfavored and only applicable when they
“bear a reasonable relationship to the party’s actual business
practices.”99 The court regarded Commerce’s behavior of “cherry-

90. See id. at 1375 (finding that Commerce’s recalculation of the U.S. price using
other sources of data was proper and within the scope of the remand).
91. Id. at 1379.
92. Id. at 1377. An appellate court uses the “substantial evidence” standard to
review a lower’s courts factual determinations in considering whether the holding
was based on substantial evidence. Id.
93. Id. The majority asserted that the proper standard of review of the Agency’s
reasoning, a matter separate from review of the factual evidence, was the “arbitrary
and capricious” standard. Id. Under this standard, a reviewing court considers
whether the agency’s reasoning was based on something reasonable or whether it was
arbitrary. The reviewing court then applies the substantial evidence test to
determine if there is substantial evidence of arbitrary or capricious action. Id.
94. Id. at 1372, 1373 n.3, 1375.
95. Id. at 1378.
96. Id. at 1376 (referring to the appellant’s argument challenging the Agency’s
reasoning behind the recalculation).
97. Id. at 1378.
98. Id. (quoting Parkdale Int’l v. United States, 475 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
99. Id. at 1379 (citing Gallant Ocean v. United States, 602 F.3d 1319, 1323 (2010)).
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pick[ing]” data, for the sole purpose of creating the most adverse
effect possible, as clearly arbitrary and capricious.100
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Reyna argued that the majority
made three crucial errors in its determination. First, the judge found
that it was an error for the majority to address the AFA issue because
it was neither appealed nor brought before the court in a proper
manner.101 In fact, what appellants argued against was the usage of
certain data—namely, the changed U.S. price—and not Commerce’s
methodology in recalculating the AFA rate.102 Judge Reyna accused
the majority of improperly expanding its review beyond the scope of
the appeal.103
Further, even if appellants were challenging
Commerce’s method for determining the AFA in this case, Judge
Reyna asserted that the methods were also justified.104 According to
Judge Reyna, the AFA rate was not directly applied and served the
general purpose of the statute.105
Second, Reyna accused the majority of misinterpreting the AFA
statute—arguing that it was not meant solely for noncompliant
respondents, but was also a tool to be used by the Agency to avoid
absurd results. Absurd results, according to Judge Reyna, would
include the application of de minimis rates to a respondent who does
not deserve it based on insufficient data.106
Third, Judge Reyna argued that using the “arbitrary and capricious”
standard to guide the decision, as opposed to the “substantial evidence”
standard, was incorrect.107 Judge Reyna maintained that if the majority
had focused on the issue presented, which was an issue of fact,
Commerce would have won the argument based on the evidence.108
Judge Reyna accused the majority of stripping Commerce of the tools
necessary to make the recalculated decision on remand and warned that
failing to defer to Commerce’s administrative authority could result in
worse results for the appellants.109
100. Id.
101. See id. at 1380 (Reyes, J., dissenting) (noting that the appellant had conceded
the issue in both the underlying administrative proceedings and in the CIT).
102. Id. at 1380–81.
103. Id. at 1380.
104. Id. at 1383, 1385.
105. See id. at 1385 (explaining that it was reasonable for Commerce to select an
AFA rate sufficiently adverse within the bounds of the statute).
106. Id. at 1380.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 1380–81 (suggesting that by denying Commerce the deference it was
owed under the proper standard of review, the majority’s holding was contrary to
court precedent).
109. See id. at 1381 n.2 (illustrating how the majority’s opinion would leave the
appellant with a higher margin than it obtained in either the initial investigation or
the remand).
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In another antidumping case focused on China, Global Commoddity
Gropu LLC v. United States,110 an importer of citric acid and certain
citrate salts appealed a determination that its blend of citric acid falls
outside the scope of the antidumping order because the Chineseoriginated component consists of less than the order’s minimum
threshold of 40%.111 Following an investigation, Commerce issued an
antidumping order on citric acid and certain citric salts from Canada
and the PRC.112 The scope of the order included the following: (1)
all grades of the unblended product; (2) blends of the product; and
(3) blends with other ingredients, “such as sugar, where the
unblended form(s) . . . constitute 40 percent or more, by weight, of
the blend.”113
It was determined that Global Commodity Group’s (“Global”)
merchandise was comprised of 35% citric acid from the PRC and
65% citric acid from other countries.114 Global claimed that the citric
acid found to be from other countries was considered “other
ingredients” and was subject to the scope condition requiring 40% on
the unblended form.115 After a scope inquiry, Commerce found the
merchandise to be commingled and not blended, noting that the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”)
classification is different for commingled versus blended products
and that Global cannot “have it both ways” in this regard.116 Global
appealed and claimed that the interpretation “impermissibly
expand[ed] the scope of the order.”117 Affording deference to
Commerce’s interpretation, the CIT found the interpretation to be
within the scope of the order.118 Global appealed.119
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by re-emphasizing the highly
fact-intensive nature of a scope inquiry, reasoning that such an
inquiry should be subject to the “substantial evidence” standard on
review.120 While the court sympathized with Global’s interpretation
of the order due to the reference of blends of one kind of citric

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

709 F.3d 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1335.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1136.
Id.
Id. at 1136–37.
Id. at 1138.
Id. at 1137.
Id.
Id. at 1138.
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products with another, it essentially gave great deference to
Commerce’s interpretation.121
The court reasoned that the term “such as sugar” in the order
excluded citric-like products and hence the 65% citric acid found
from other countries in Global’s merchandise.122 The court also
found Commerce’s HTSUS interpretation reasonable although not
dispositive.123 Lastly, the court held that Commerce had not
expanded the scope of the order because its application of the
interpretation given in the scope inquiry only included the citric acid
from PRC, thereby meeting the two limitations of the order.124
Commerce’s findings were found to be reasonable and the CIT
decision was affirmed.125
In Itochu Building v. United States,126 the issue before the court was
whether Commerce could use a failure to reply to a request for
information regarding an administrative review of an antidumping
order as a bar to challenge the results of that review.127 Prior to Itochu
Building, Commerce issued an antidumping order on certain steel
nails from China.128 The order and initial review was completed in
August 2008, and the order applied to all imports as of January 23,
2008.129 In its first administrative review of the order, Mid Continent
(the petitioner who initially brought the challenge) sought to
exclude four types of steel nails by asking Commerce to initiate a
changed circumstance review.130 The request to Commerce stated
that the revocation on the specified types of nails became effective
after January 23, 2008—limiting its applicability to imports not
subject to final duty determinations.131 Itochu submitted comments
in support of Mid Continent’s request.132 Itochu also requested that
the changed circumstance review be expedited.133

121. See id. at 1139 (acknowledging that Global’s “interpretation of the Orders
[wa]s not entirely frivolous”).
122. See id. at 1135–36, 1139 (highlighting that “sugar” was listed as an example of
“other” ingredients, which provides strong evidence that the order excluded citriclike products).
123. Id. at 1139–40.
124. See id. at 1140 (referring back to the two limitations of the order: the physical
scope of the product and the country of origin).
125. Id.
126. 733 F.3d 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
127. Id. at 1145.
128. Id. at 1142.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1142–43.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1143.
133. Id.
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Commerce made a preliminary determination in support of Mid
Continent and Itochu’s position but declined to change the effective
date of the order.134 The preliminary determination stated that the
effective date would be August 1, 2009—the date after the first
completed administrative review.135 In the preliminary determination,
Commerce allowed comments on the finding for up to fourteen days.136
Itochu did not comment.137 Commerce issued its final determination,
which maintained a later effective date than Itochu initially requested.138
Itochu challenged the final date, but the CIT dismissed the claim and
found that Itochu had waived any objection by its silence during
Commerce’s request for comments, thereby failing to exhaust the
administrative remedies available.139
Reviewing under an “abuse of discretion” standard, the Federal
Circuit held that the CIT’s dismissal for failure to exhaust its
administrative remedies was inappropriate.140 The court described
two reasons why a party might not have to exhaust their
administrative remedies: (1) where the review would be “ineffectual”;
and (2) when the issue presented is a “pure question of law” that
requires no further findings of fact.141
The court concluded that Itochu’s comments after the preliminary
determination would have been “ineffectual,” or futile, as there were
no comments made available to Commerce that had not been
brought forth prior to the determination.142 In essence, no other
comment from Itochu “would have been significant to Commerce’s
consideration.”143 The court also noted that Itochu’s interest in a
speedy determination would not have been served by comments,
since such comments could have delayed the determination for up to
270 days.144 Given Itochu’s interests and the futility of commenting
on the issue, the Federal Circuit concluded that the exhaustion
134. Id. at 1143–44.
135. Id. at 1144.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1146.
141. Id. (reasoning that when an issue is a pure question of law, requiring
exhaustion may not serve any agency’s interest and, moreover, could result in a delay
harming the agency).
142. See id. (noting that Commerce did not mention it rejected Itochu’s request for a
changed circumstance review because the company failed to make additional factual or
legal arguments; rather, Commerce not only rejected Itochu’s request outright, it
simultaneously defended the same position against review in a different case).
143. Id.
144. See id. at 1147 (observing that it would only take forty-five days for Commerce
to provide its final determination if it did not receive any comments).
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doctrine could not bar Itochu’s claim and that dismissal by the CIT
was inappropriate.145
In an interesting appeal brought by Target Corporation and the
United States, the court considered whether an antidumping order
on a single product includes mixed goods of which the subject
product comprises a portion.146 In Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United
States,147 Target Corporation (“Target”) initiated a scope inquiry to
determine whether a tool kit containing nails subject to an
antidumping order should be excluded from that order as “mixed
media.”148 Mixed media refers to an item whose components are
both subject and non-subject to an antidumping order.149 This was
despite the fact that no such exception existed in the original
order.150 There was no dispute that the nails were of the type subject to
the order but their inclusion in a larger collection of items made them a
small portion of the total value of the tool kit.151 Commerce interpreted
the order to exclude mixed media items and Mid Continent challenged
the finding at the CIT.152 The CIT concluded that the mere fact that
mixed media items were not explicitly mentioned in the order did not
mean that Commerce had the authority to exclude them from the
order.153 Accordingly, the CIT remanded the case back to Commerce to
interpret the scope of the order.
Commerce found for Target again on remand after conducting a
mixed-media inquiry evaluating the following factors: (1) the
practicability of separating/repacking the merchandise; (2) the value
of the subject merchandise in comparison to the whole; (3) the use

145. Id.
146. See Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 725 F.3d 1295, 1298 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
147. 725 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
148. Id. at 1298.
149. Walgreen Co. of Deerfield, IL v. United States, 33 C.I.T. 1620 (2009), aff’d,
620 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010). In a mixed-media inquiry, Commerce first
determines whether the item is a new product composed of subject and non-subject
materials, or whether the item’s components remain independent and are merely
sold as a unit. Once Commerce labels the item as a mixed-media set, it then assesses
whether the subject material included in the item is a minor component. See Mark
David Davis et al., U.S. Court of International Trade Overview: Non-Market Economy Cases
in 2011, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 15, 46 (2012).
150. Mid Continent Nail Corp., 725 F.3d 1298.
151. See id. at 1299 (“In each case, Target estimated that the nails represented
between 0.8% and 3.3% of the cost of the tool kit and between 0.5% and 1.8% of its
retail value.”).
152. Id.
153. Id. (citing the CIT’s ruling in Mid Continent Nail Corp. v United States, 770
F. Supp. 2d 1372 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2011)).
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of the component compared to the use of the merchandise as a
whole; and (4) any other relevant factors that might arise.154
The CIT rejected Commerce’s findings, remanding again and
explaining that the final order contained no reference to a mixed-media
inquiry, which meant Commerce lacked authority to conduct such an
inquiry.155 Therefore, although the nails subject to the antidumping
order mixed with tools not subject to the order in the tool kit,
Commerce could not exclude the nails from the scope of the order.156
Commerce revised its ruling to comply and the CIT affirmed.157 Target
and the United States appealed to the Federal Circuit.158
The Federal Circuit noted that Commerce enjoyed broad powers in
clarifying its antidumping orders;159 however, Commerce could not
clarify an order contrary to the order’s terms or change its scope.160 The
court found that the CIT erred in finding that the order could not be
interpreted to include mixed-media inquiries, stating that “Commerce’s
practice of conducting mixed media inquiries falls within its
‘responsibility . . . to determine the scope of the final orders’.”161
While the court disagreed with the CIT’s finding, the court agreed
that Commerce had not provided sufficient reasoning for why the
toolbox items in Target’s scope inquiry fell outside the order.162 The
court rejected the “newly announced criteria” for interpreting mixed
media inquiries, especially because it was developed after the fact.163
Interestingly, the court outlined how Commerce should go about
determining scope in inquiries such as this one. First, the court
determined that Commerce should look to the literal terms of the
order.164 If there is ambiguity, Commerce may look at the regulatory
history or 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1) materials,165 such as physical
154. Id. at 1299–1300.
155. Id. at 1300.
156. Id.
157. Id. (citing the CIT’s ruling in Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 34
I.T.R.D. 1839 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2012)).
158. Id.
159. See id. (citing Novosteel SA v. United States, 284 F.3d 1261, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
160. See id. (citing Global Commodity Grp. LLC v. United States, 709 F.3d 1134,
1138 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
161. Id. at 1301 (quoting Walgreen Co. of Deerfield, IL v. United States, 620 F.3d
1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). In Walgreen, the court upheld Commerce’s conclusion
that the tissue paper subject to an antidumping order, when mixed with non-subject
wrapping paper, remained within the scope of the order. 620 F.3d at 1356–57.
162. Mid Continent Nail Corp., 725 F.3d at 1302.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1)(2013) (noting that such materials include “the
descriptions of the merchandise contained in the petition, the initial investigation,
and the determinations of the Secretary (including prior scope determinations) and
the Commission”).
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descriptions in the order, material from its investigation, prior scope
determinations, and so on.166 If those materials are not dispositive,
Commerce may look to § 351.225(k)(2), which includes such factors
as (1) materials or the product’s characteristics, (2) the expectations
of the ultimate purchaser, (3) the channels of trade in which the
product will move, and (4) the manner of advertising.167 Any product
that is substantially transformed in the merchandise will not be
subject to the order.168
While the court did not dictate the outcome of the remand, it
indicated that a strong presumption arises for including the toolbox
nails as subject to the order.169 This presumption derived from the
language of the order and could only be rebutted by “published
guidance issued prior to the date of the original antidumping
order.”170 The requirement of published documents as a basis for the
ruling complied with the ideas of notice and avoids the “inherently
arbitrary nature of unpublished ad hoc determinations.”171 In that
spirit, Commerce could use HTSUS subheadings or prior scope
rulings that had been made publicly available.172 The case was again
remanded so that Commerce could revisit the mixed-media inquiry
as it applied to Target’s compliance with the court’s guidelines.173
The court in NSK Corp. v. U.S. International Trade Commission174
addressed a sunset review of ball bearing imports from several
countries in which the ITC concluded that imports from Japan and
the United Kingdom (UK) were materially injuring domestic
producers in the United States.175 The CIT rejected this conclusion
and ultimately remanded the case four times until the ITC finally
issued a finding of no material injury from the UK and Japan.176
In 1989, Commerce issued an antidumping order on ball bearings
from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden,
166. Mid Continent Nail Corp., 725 F.3d at 1302.
167. Id. (citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2)).
168. See id. (defining “substantially transformed” to mean the merchandise’s
properties have been altered to the extent the merchandise can no longer be
considered the same product originally subject to the antidumping order).
169. Id. at 1304.
170. Id.
171. Id. (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974)).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. 716 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The extensive history of the case includes the
following prior decisions by the CIT: NSK Corp. v. United States (NSK I), 577 F. Supp.
2d 1322 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2008); NSK Corp. v. United States (NSK II), 593 F. Supp. 2d
1355 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2008); and NSK Corp. v. United States (NSK III), 637 F. Supp. 2d
1311 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009).
175. NSK Corp., 716 F. 3d at 1354.
176. Id. at 1355.
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Thailand, and the UK.177 Its first sunset review in 1999 affirmed that
it could not lift the antidumping order for France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Singapore and the UK without causing material injury to the
U.S. domestic industry for ball bearings.178 During its second sunset
review, the Commission removed Singapore from the order but
issued affirmative determinations for France, China, Germany, Italy,
Japan and the UK.179
The ITC reached its initial determination after cumulating the
subject imports from these countries.180 It concluded that it could
not revoke the order because it would cause material injury to the
United States’ ball bearings industry.181 Further, the ITC found that
the producing countries maintained an excess capacity for producing
ball bearings and, therefore, the United States was in a vulnerable
position because of high domestic prices coupled with large amounts
of ball bearing imports.182 Japan and the UK appealed the finding.183
In NSK Corp. v. United States184 (NSK I), the CIT affirmed that the
products would have competitive overlap with domestically produced
products, that volume would increase upon revocation, and that
these facts would likely have price effects.185 However, the CIT
remanded to allow Commerce to address whether non-subject
imports also affect the market and whether this displacement in the
market would allow Commerce to remove the antidumping order
without the recurrence of material injury to the domestic sector.186
Following the outcome of Mittal Steel v. United States,187 Commerce
argued that whether the order would actually lead to the elimination
of the good was not relevant, as the focus should be, as the Mittal
court held, on “cause of injury in the past, not the prospect of

177. Id. at 1354–55.
178. Id. at 1355–56.
179. Id. at 1356 & n.1.
180. Id. at 1356.
181. Id. at 1351, 1355.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 577 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2008).
185. NSK Corp., 716 F. 3d at 1357. The CIT defined the concept of price effects in
an earlier case, NSK I, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 1345. Price effects include (1) underselling
caused by importing merchandise that is cheaper than the equivalent domestic
product and, similarly, (2) the significant depression of domestic product prices
resulting from the import of subject merchandise. Id. at 1345.
186. NSK Corp., 716 F.3d at 1357.
187. 542 F.3d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that imports should be a
substantial factor in injury, not trivial or incidental).
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effectiveness in the future.”188 The CIT rejected this argument in
NSK Corp. v. United States189 (NSK II).
In an attempt to comply with the CIT, Commerce reopened the
record.190 In Commerce’s first remand determination, it reaffirmed
its original findings—determining that the domestic market was
susceptible to adverse impacts if the order was removed.191 It also
found that non-subject imports were not likely to capture the market
share of the subject-import if the order was removed.192 In NSK Corp.
v. United States193 (NSK III), the CIT remanded again on the same
basis as NSK I, asking for a “more focused analysis” of non-subject
imports within the market.194
In its second remand determination, Commerce maintained its
position, relying on various evidence regarding the UK’s market
share and its ability to sell and produce ball bearings.195 Commerce
again found the industry “vulnerable” and reached the same
conclusion regarding non-subject imports in the market.196 The CIT
remanded again.197 In the third remand determination, Commerce
disagreed with, but conceded to, the CIT’s conclusion that upon the
revocation of the antidumping order, subject imports from the UK
would not have an adverse effect on domestic industry.198 However,
Commerce maintained its position regarding Japan.199 The CIT
affirmed Commerce’s decision regarding the UK, but remanded
again accusing Commerce of “ignor[ing] the influence of nonsubject imports in the market.”200
In its Fourth Remand
Determination, Commerce held that both subject-imports from the
UK and Japan would not have a significant impact upon revocation
and again noted that the CIT’s remand instructions “compelled” it to
reach this decision.201 The CIT affirmed.202 Commerce appealed the
188. NSK Corp., 716 F.3d at 1357; see also Mittal Steel, 542 F.3d at 876 (assessing the
past injury caused by steel wire rod imported from Trinidad and Tobago).
189. 593 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1359 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2008); see also NSK Corp., 716 F.3d
at 1358 (noting non-subject import analysis is appropriate when triggering factors
are present). The phrase “triggering factors” refers to when a commodity product is
central to the complaint and “price competitive non-subject imports are a significant
factor in the market.” NSK II, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 1359.
190. NSK Corp., 716 F.3d at 1358.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 637 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009).
194. Id. at 1324.
195. NSK Corp., 716 F.3d at 1360.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1361.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1362.
201. Id. at 1362–63.
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CIT’s decision and cross-appellants claimed that the finding for the
UK and Japan should have been applicable to the remaining
countries.203
After this lengthy back and forth between Commerce and the CIT,
the principal issue before the Federal Circuit was, which standard of
review to apply.204 In cases where the CIT directs Commerce to reach
a negative conclusion, as it did here, the court reviews that decision
using a “substantial evidence” standard.205 Applying this standard of
review, the court found that substantial evidence supported Commerce’s
claim that the UK ball bearings would have discernable adverse impacts
upon revocation of the order.206 Because of this, the court stated that
Commerce could cumulate the subject-imports of the UK with the
remaining countries to make its calculation.207 The court held that the
CIT had erred in considering the weight of evidence against
Commerce’s position.208 As the court noted, “when adequate evidence
exists on both sides of an issue, assigning evidentiary weight falls
exclusively within the authority of the Commission.”209
The court did not deny the existence of evidence that would
support the remand determinations on non-subject imports.210
Instead, the court deferred to Commerce’s determination of the
weight to be accorded to such evidence.211 It concluded that
substantial evidence supported an affirmative determination for both
the UK and Japan, and therefore reversed and vacated the CIT
proceedings and findings from Commerce.212 The court’s action thus
rendered the cross-appeal moot.213
The court in Union Steel v. United States214 added a new facet to
In an
Commerce’s controversial practice of “zeroing.”215
antidumping investigation, zeroing is the practice of eliminating
202. Id. at 1363.
203. Id. (noting that the Commission issued its decision under protest and
appeared dissatisfied with the CIT’s ruling regarding the Commission’s decision to
cumulate imports from the subject countries).
204. Id. The standard of review could be whether the CIT abused its discretion by
remanding the Commission’s determination regarding Japan and the UK, or
whether there was substantial evidence to support the Commission’s findings. See id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1366.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1369.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 713 F.3d 1101 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
215. Id. at 1103.
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margins between foreign domestic prices and U.S. import prices
when the U.S. import price is higher than the foreign domestic
price.216 In other words, goods that are not dumped on U.S. markets
and are in fact sold at a higher price than they are sold on the foreign
market are “zeroed” and their margins are not included as offsets to
the total dumping margin.217
The practice of zeroing has been challenged at the World Trade
Organization (WTO) resulting in several panel and appellate body
decisions that have decried the practice as a violation of the
Antidumping Agreement.218 Subsequently, the United States agreed
to eliminate the practice of zeroing in initial antidumping
investigations.219 However, the practice is still applied in other
contexts, such as “targeted dumping” and, as Union Steel,
administrative reviews.220
Prior to the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1995 (URAA), the
Department of Commerce had engaged in average-to-transaction
methods to determine the dumping margin on imported merchandise
in both investigations and administrative reviews.221 After the URAA,
Commerce continued to use the calculation method in administrative
reviews; however, it employed average-to-average or transaction-totransaction methods in antidumping investigations.222
The continued use of zeroing in administrative reviews (but not in
investigations) was challenged in 2011 under the same order at issue
in Union Steel.223 In that instance, Union Steel made the same
argument as in the Dongbu Steel case.224 The court vacated and
216. Id. at 1103–04.
217. See, e.g., Dongbu Steel Co. v. United States, 635 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (describing zeroing as a “controversial” methodology “historically” used by
Commerce); Timken Co. v. United States, 354 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (providing
a general definition of “zeroing”).
218. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Laws, Regulations and
Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), ¶¶ 3(c), 6, 263(b),
WT/DS294/AB/R (Apr. 18, 2006), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports
/wtoab/us-zeroing(ab).pdf (explaining that the European Communities have
accused the United States of violating the Antidumping Agreement several times due
to the United States’ practice of zeroing, and that the WTO has often agreed with
the European Communities); see also Union Steel, 713 F.3d at 1105 (noting these
challenges made to the international trade organizations).
219. See Union Steel, 713 F.3d at 1105 (citing Antidumping Proceedings:
Calculations of the Weighted-Average Dumping Margin during an Antidumping
Investigation, 71 Fed. Reg. 77,722 (Dec. 27, 2006)).
220. Id. at 1104. Note that South Korea lodged a complaint about this practice
with the WTO in 2013. See, e.g., Scott Flaherty, Zeroing Faces Novel Test in WTO Row over
Washer Duties, LAW360 (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/471407.
221. Union Steel, 713 F.3d at 1104.
222. Id.
223. Dongbu Steel Co. v. United States, 635 F.3d 1363, 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
224. Id. at 1368.
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remanded so that Commerce could explain “why the statutory
language supports [an] inconsistent interpretation.”225 According to
the standard of Timken Co. v. United States,226 the court had previously
held that the statutory provision at issue, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A),
was ambiguous and noted that deference would be given to the
Department’s reasonable interpretation.227 Commerce failed to
provide a justification in the next case before the court,228 and a
voluntary remand was ordered in Union Steel, so that Commerce
might again provide a reasonable interpretation.229 On remand,
Commerce, arguing before the CIT, provided that differing
interpretations are an exception to the rule, but that the rule is
generally interpreted to permit the use of zeroing.230 The exception
granted after the WTO settlement was not arbitrary but instead was a
specific response to the “international obligation[s] [of] the
Executive Branch.”231 The CIT found that Commerce had not
abused its discretion by changing the method used in investigations
but not in administrative reviews.232
The court reviewed the CIT’s decision de novo, considering
whether Commerce had provided substantial evidence to support its
decision to apply zeroing to administrative reviews.233 The court held
that “Commerce’s differing interpretation [was] reasonable because
the comparison methodologies compute dumping margins in
different ways and are used for different reasons.”234 The court
agreed with the Government’s argument that less specificity was
required in investigations because more data is compiled and used—
producing a risk of error that is easily fixed by offsetting.235 The court
stated that this logic did not apply to administrative reviews, which
perform comparisons on an individual transaction basis and are
meant to target the “masked dumping” that average calculations

225. Id. at 1372–73.
226. 354 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
227. Id. at 1342.
228. See JTEKT Corp. v. United States, 642 F.3d 1378, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding
that although Commerce’s actions were reasonable, the failure to provide a justification for
these action required the Federal Circuit to vacate the law court’s decision).
229. Union Steel v. United States, 713 F.3d 1101, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
230. Union Steel v. United States, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1356–57 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2012), aff’d, 713 F.3d 1101.
231. Union Steel, 713 F.3d at 1106.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1109.
235. Id.
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might hide.236 Applying Chevron deference, the court deferred to
Commerce’s reasonable interpretation of the statute.237
The court emphasized that the outcome of the WTO decisions had
limited effect and that it was Commerce’s decision whether to
expand the findings determined in the settlement outside average-toaverage transactions (i.e., investigations).238 Commerce’s justification
was found to be sufficient and the differing interpretation reasonable
in light of the justifications provided.239
Yangzhou Bestpak Gifts & Crafts Co. v. United States240 represented the
often-difficult balance that Commerce must strike between
establishing a fair and equitable rate, or dumping-margin, and
punishing non-cooperative respondents in an antidumping
investigation.241 Bestpak was a Chinese exporter of narrow woven
ribbons that was subject to an antidumping investigation set from
January 1 to June 30, 2009.242 To select the mandatory respondents
subject to review, Commerce sent out a quantity and value
questionnaire to all known exporters.243 Commerce determined that
only the largest producers—both exporters—would be chosen for the
individual investigation.244 It concluded that Yama, the complying
exporter, had a de minimis dumping margin.245 The remaining
exporter, Jintian, refused to comply and was assigned an adverse facts
available (AFA) rate of 247.65% for the China-wide market.246
Commerce did not choose a replacement respondent to fill Jintian’s
absence and there were no volunteers.247
Bestpak applied for a separate nonmarket rate by showing that it
was not subject to government control.248 Nonetheless, Commerce
determined a median rate of 123.83% by averaging the two individual
investigations.249 Commerce argued that the means used were
reasonable given the lack of available data and the statutory time
constraints of the investigation.250
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id.
Id. at 1110.
Id.
Id. at 1109.
716 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1375.
Id. at 1374.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1375.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1379.
Id. at 1375.
Id.
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Disagreeing with Commerce’s finding, Bestpak maintained that
the rate assigned did not correlate to its actual dumping margin
and that an invoice, which the CIT refused to include in its review,
proved this argument.251 Bestpak raised this error to the Federal
Circuit on appeal.252
The court found that the methods employed to find Bestpak’s
separate rate were reasonable; however, in light of the fact that there
was only one participant’s data used in the calculation, the court held
that in this instance, it was inappropriate to apply this method of
simple averaging.253 The court stated that the findings of the
investigation were insufficient to support the separate rate that
Commerce had established.254 The Government also failed to
provide any other economic proof in support of the 123.83% rate,
which it described as “more than doubl[ing] the import’s sale
price.”255 The court held that the imposed rate appeared to be
punitive and not in accordance with the antidumping statute.256 It
then reiterated that the margins imposed must be calculated on a
“fair and equitable basis.”257
In concluding, the court agreed with the CIT’s decision not to
include the Bestpak invoice in its analysis.258 The court reasoned
that failure to exhaust administrative remedies and present the
invoice evidence before Commerce precluded its usage on
appeal.259 Applying an abuse of discretion standard of review, 260
the court found that the CIT did not abuse its discretion in
denying admission of that evidence.261 The case was vacated and

251. Id. at 1376.
252. Id. at 1377.
253. Id. at 1378.
254. Id. at 1378–79.
255. Id. at 1379.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1380 (quoting SNR Roulements v. United States, 402 F.3d 1358, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2005)).
258. Id. at 1380–81.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1381. The abuse of discretion standard is used by appellate courts in
reviewing decisions of lower courts. An appellate court will rule that a lower court’s
decision an abuse of discretion “when its decision is based on clearly erroneous
findings of fact, is based on erroneous interpretations of the law, or is clearly
unreasonably, arbitrary, or fanciful.” Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448,
1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
261. Yangzhou Bestpak Gifts, 716 F.3d at 1381 (reasoning that Bestpak did not raise
the invoice issue until its second appeal to the CIT although it knew the importance
of the document to Commerce’s analysis and had opportunities to raise the issue
earlier).
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remanded so that the rate/dumping margin might be reassessed
consistent with the opinion.262
II. PRECEDENTIAL HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE CASES
The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS)
largely models the International Harmonized Commodity Coding
and Classification System set out by the World Customs Organization.
The HTSUS includes a ten-digit code for over 17,000 goods, from
agriculture to technology.263 Descriptions found within the HTSUS
are often the subject of litigation given that the classification of a
good within the HTSUS determines the tariff that it will be assessed
upon entry into the United States.
This Part addresses several important classification cases from the
2013 term. Among these are a case involving the meaning of “slip-on
footwear” with respect to popular boots; a case debating the
calculation of import costs in determining the value of imported
tuna; another case examining the classification of engineered
flooring that closely resembles plywood; and finally, a case debating
the difference between clocks and meteorological devices. It was an
active term for classification issues last year.
The court in Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. United States264 addressed the
classification of boots and assessed whether they were included in an
HTSUS subheading for slip-on footwear.265 Deckers imported UGG
boots and attempted to enter them under HTSUS subheading
6404.19.90.266 Customs instead assigned the item under subheading
6404.19.35 as “footwear of the slip-on type.”267 The 19.35 Customs
classification is assigned a duty rate of 37.5%, as opposed to the 9%
duty imposed by 19.90 classification.268
Deckers claimed that the subheading Customs chose to apply was
explicitly for shoes and, therefore, could not apply to boots.269
Deckers also claimed that its product must be “pulled on” and could

262. Id.
263. See generally U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, USITC PUB. 4299, HARMONIZED TARIFF
SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES (2014 ed.) [hereinafter HTSUS], available at
http://hts.usitc.gov.
264. 714 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
265. Id. at 1365.
266. This provision covers footwear with outer soles of rubber/plastic and uppers
of textile valued over $12 per pair. Id.
267. This provision covers footwear with outer soles of rubber/plastic and uppers
of textile with open toes/heels or slip-on type, 10% or more by weight of
rubber/plastic. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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therefore not qualify as “slip-on footwear.”270 It claimed that its
reasoning was one based on industry standards.271 The claim was
dismissed on a motion for summary judgment in the CIT.272
On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied a plain-language review of
the statute, examined congressional intent, and interpreted a U.S.
Department of Treasury decision to conclude that the CIT’s decision
was correct as to the proper classification of the boots at issue.273 The
court began with the statutory language—finding the clear language
of the subheading to include both shoes and boots.274 This, the court
maintained, was indicated by the use of the term “footwear” as
opposed to “shoes” or “boots.”275
The court concluded that
“footwear” encompassed both items and explained that “[t]he
cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to
destroy” the statute in its interpretation, giving effect “to every clause
and word of the statute.”276
To address the argument that the boots must be “pulled on,” the
court relied on Treasury Decision 93-88, which specifically indicated
that a “slip-on” included “a boot which must be pulled on.”277 While
the court warned that the decision should not be construed as a
Customs ruling, it conceded that Customs and importers use it to
better understand classification requirements.278 The court flatly
rejected Deckers’ argument that the meaning “slip-on” is contrary to
industry standards for the UGG boot.279 In reaching this conclusion,
the court cited several examples from various commercial websites
that indicated that the UGG boot at issue was commonly referred to
as a “slip-on” in advertisements.280
The court rejected the argument that contrary to the definition
in the subheading, the UGG boot at issue must be “pulled on.” 281
Instead, the court returned to the plain-language reading of the
statute to affirm the CIT’s definition of “slip-on footwear” as
“footwear that does not contain ‘laces or buckles or other
fasteners’.”282 In preserving the CIT’s definition, the court
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id. at 1367.
Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1366.
Id. at 1367–68.
Id. at 1367.
Id.
Id. at 1367–68 (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955)).
Id. at 1368.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1369.
Id.
Id. at 1370.
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upheld other sections of the statute that would be rendered
superfluous under Deckers’ interpretation—giving effect “to all
[the HTSUS] provisions, so that no part . . . [is made]
inoperative or superfluous.”283
Lastly, the court turned to the standard of review for summary
judgment,284 agreeing with the CIT that there remained no issues
of material fact “regarding the salient physical characteristics of
the Classic Crochet boots.”285 Accordingly, the court affirmed the
CIT’s dismissal.286
Judge Dyk dissented from the majority.287 He found the words “of
the slip-on type” to be limiting and that they excluded boots.288 He
also disagreed with the plain-language analysis of the majority—
finding that the subheading included three defining characteristics
of products to which it applied: (1) shoes (2) that are easy to slip on
(3) with few or no fasteners.289 Judge Dyk stated that the boots at
issue are neither shoes nor are they easy to slip on—defeating the
purposes indicated by a “slip-on shoe” in accordance with a plain
English interpretation.290 Judge Dyk criticized the majority’s reliance
on the government’s collection of “Footwear Definitions” and found
the entirety of the argument unpersuasive.291
In Del Monte Corp. v. United States,292 the court addressed whether
post-importation payment adjustments could be used to calculate
actual transaction costs.293 In addition, it analyzed the meaning of “in
oil” with reference to the packing of tuna.294 Del Monte imported
cooked tuna packaged in a sauce consisting of a small portion of
sunflower oil (.62% total weight).295 Customs determined that the
items should be classified as tuna “in oil” under HTSUS subheading
1604.14.10296 at a duty rate of 35%.297 Del Monte argued that the

283. Id. at 1371 (quoting Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)).
284. Id. (“[T]he grant of summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine
dispute as to the nature of the merchandise and the classification determination turns on
the proper meaning and scope of the relevant tariff provisions.”).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1372.
287. Id. at 1373 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1374.
291. Id.
292. 730 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
293. Id. at 1356.
294. Id. at 1355.
295. Id. at 1353.
296. Id.; HTSUS, supra note 264, subheading 1604.14.22.
297. HTSUS, supra note 264, subheading 1604.14.22.
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item should be classified under subheading 1604.14.22 as tuna “not
in oil”298 at a duty rate of 6%.299
Additionally, there was a dispute over the price of the goods
between Del Monte and the supplier in Thailand that Del Monte
claimed should have been taken into account during Customs’
appraisal of the items.300 Del Monte agreed to an estimated price
of $1.67 per case, but the invoiced cost at importation was around
$3.00 per case.301 Later negotiations between the supplier and Del
Monte resulted in a “credit note” to Del Monte for approximately
$1.5 million.302 When appraising the value of the goods, Customs
used the invoiced amount at importation and did not take into
account the later credit that Del Monte received. 303 The CIT
granted the government’s motion for summary judgment and Del
Monte appealed.304
The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s findings that Customs
properly classified the imported items at issue as tuna “in oil” and
properly rejected the later adjustment to the importation price.305
The court affirmed that the “goods are considered ‘in oil’ even if the
liquid substance does not consist entirely of oil.”306 The court
distinguished the case Del Monte used to support its argument
because, in that case, the tuna was cooked in oil and could not be
classified as tuna packaged in oil.307 As the court explained, here the
items were not cooked in oil, but were packaged in oil—a key factor
in classifying the item as either “in oil” or not.308
Next, the court affirmed Customs’ decision on the valuation of the
imported tuna based upon the clear language of § 1401a(a)(1).309
The court reasoned that the “transaction value” should be defined as
“the price actually paid or payable for the merchandise when sold for
exportation to the United States.”310 Additionally, the court noted
the direct statutory command that “[a]ny rebate . . . after the date of

298. Del Monte Corp., 730 F.3d at 1353–54; HTSUS, supra note 264, subheading
1604.14.22.
299. HTSUS, supra note 264, subheading 1604.14.22.
300. Del Monte Corp., 730 F.3d at 1354.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1357.
306. Id. at 1355.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1355–56.
309. Id. at 1356 (referring to 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(a)(1) (2012)).
310. Id.
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the importation . . . shall be disregarded in determining the
transaction value.”311
The court rejected Del Monte’s argument that the value was based
on a “formula” agreed to between Del Monte and the supplier as
described by 19 C.F.R. § 152.103(a)(1), and that as a “formula” it
should have been adjusted after the credit.312 The court found that
the usage of a “formula” must be clear and definite in order to rebut
the “otherwise-strong statutory prohibition on using payments postdating importation.”313 Unable to find enough evidence to rebut the
statutory mandate in § 1401a, the court affirmed the ITC’s decision
allowing Customs to disregard the credit in its final appraisal.314
The court addressed a classification issue in Kahrs International, Inc.
v. United States,315 examining the assignment of a “plywood”
Kahrs
classification to engineered wood flooring imports.316
International imported engineered wood flooring, which it wanted
classified under HTSUS subheading 4418 as “[b]uilders’ joinery and
carpentry of wood.”317 This assignment would have made the product
duty-free.318 Customs instead classified the item as “plywood” under
subheading 4412 with an 8% duty rate.319
Kahrs claimed that its product was more like “parquet panels”
covered by subheading 4418 due to its laminated faux wood finish.320
Kars additionally claimed that the more specific description in
subheading 4418 should apply in accordance with HTSUS General
Rule of Interpretation (“GRI”) 3, though the flooring may be
classified under both subsections prima facie.321
Applying a plain-language analysis of the GRI 3 and the
accompanying Explanatory Notes, and analyzing a 2001 Customs
ruling, the Federal Circuit determined that the original Customs
classification of Kahrs’ flooring was correct.322 The court began by
analogizing the Kahrs issue to Boen Hardwood Flooring, Inc. v. United
States,323 in which “plywood” under HTSUS subheading 4412 was

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Id.
Id. (citing 19 C.F.R. § § 152.103(a)(1) (2013)).
Id.
Id.
713 F.3d 640 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 644.
Id. at 643.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 647.
Id. at 647–48.
357 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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defined according to three requirements.324 The Kahrs’ flooring at
issue met all three requirements and was similar to the product at
issue in Boen.325 Additionally, according to the court, Kahrs indicated
no feature that would have made its flooring more unique than the
flooring in Boen.326 Next, the court turned to the HTSUS Explanatory
Notes to subheading 4412, which explained that the subheading “also
cover[ed] plywood panels or veneered panels . . . sometimes referred
to as ‘parquet flooring’.”327
Finally, the court rejected Kahrs’ argument that subheading 4418
was more specific than subheading 4412 and should be preferred
under GRI 3.328 The court found the exact opposite—that the more
specific provision was subheading 4412 as “builders’ joinery” could
mean many items, while “plywood” was specifically defined.329 The
court bolstered its argument by using a 2001 Customs ruling on the
issue where it concluded “that flooring panels consisting of one or
more strips of veneer on the surface are classifiable in heading 4412,
HTSUS.”330 The court affirmed the CIT decision, which had affirmed
the Customs classification decision.331
In La Crosse Technology v. United States,332 the Federal Circuit
addressed the classification of electronic devices that measure
weather conditions.333 Previously, Customs had classified these
imports as “other clocks” under the HTSUS.334 La Crosse argued
that the items were “meteorological appliances.”335 In La Crosse’s
adjudication before the CIT, the CIT determined that while
certain items should be classified as “weather stations,” others
should be classified as “professional models” with primarily
meteorological functions, and the remaining items should be
classified as “clocks” due to their primary time-telling functions. 336

324. Kahrs Int’l, Inc., 713 F.3d at 645 (“[W]e concluded that ‘[t]here are three
common characteristics of ‘plywood’ found in the definitions provided above: (1)
there must be at least three layers; (2) each layer must be arranged at a right angle to
its adjacent layer; and (3) the layers must be bonded together.’” (second alteration
in original) (quoting Boen, 357 F.3d at 1265)).
325. Id.
326. Id. at 646.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 648.
329. Id. at 647–48.
330. Id. at 648.
331. Id.
332. 723 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
333. Id. at 1356.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 1357.
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The CIT applied both the functionality and the marketing of the
items to make its findings.337
The CIT rejected La Crosse’s contention that all the contested
items were meteorological devices when applying GRI 1, which allows
for all items to be classified under a single heading if they are prima
facie related to that heading, or applicable as a whole under that
heading.338 La Crosse appealed the decision of the CIT regarding
those imports found to be “weather stations” and “clock” models.339
On appeal, the Federal Circuit emphasized that HTSUS terms
would be accorded their plain-language meaning, absent contrary
legislative intent.340 The court sustained the CIT’s rejection of La
Crosse’s argument on GRI 1 and went on to hold that the items at
issue could not be defined under a single heading.341 Instead, the
court agreed with the government’s contention that GRI 3(b)
applied.342 GRI 3(b) explains that classification of goods will be
determined by the “material or component which gives them their
essential character.”343
However, applying that reasoning, the court reversed the findings
regarding both the “clock” and “weather station” models.344 Instead,
they found that those models contained a significant number of
meteorological functions as compared to timekeeping functions.345
The court accepted La Crosse’s argument that the forecasting
features of the device would remove it from the HTSUS classification
covering “clocks” and place it in the broader classification for similar
meteorological devices.346
In deciding between the broader and more specific subheadings
for the devices, the court found that the broader classification should
apply.347 Therefore, the court reasoned that it was the forecasting
instrumentality that gave the import its “essential character,” but that
character alone could not lead to definition under the subheading
that explicitly listed certain meteorological devices.348 The court thus
reversed the CIT and directed all items to be classified as

337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

Id.
Id. at 1356–57.
Id. at 1357.
Id. at 1358.
Id. at 1359–60.
Id. at 1359.
Id.
Id. at 1360.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1361–62.
Id. at 1361.
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“professional items” with the primary character being their
meteorological functions.349
Rack Room Shoes, Inc. v. United States350 was the second in a series of
challenges to the alleged discriminatory nature of the HTSUS.351
This case was one of 126 cases (later updated to 173) claiming that
HTSUS discriminatorily applied rates based on gender and age—
violating the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection clause.352 The case
was preceded by Totes-Isotoner Corp. v. United States,353 where Totes
brought a similar, if not identical, claim. In Totes, the Federal Circuit
determined that the challenged provisions in the HTSUS were not
facially discriminatory.354 The court determined that Totes was
required to plead facts sufficient to prove a governmental purpose to
discriminate—in addition to disparate impact—to win a Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.355
Because Totes failed to carry this burden, the court affirmed the
CIT’s dismissal.356
After deciding Totes, the Federal Circuit allowed importers awaiting
the outcome of the case to amend their claims.357 Rack Room
amended its claim to allege that the rates on footwear for women
were higher than those for men and higher for adults, generally, than
for youths.358 Rack Room asserted that Congress “could have used
other non-gender[ed] factors” to classify products under HTSUS,
and the fact that it did not evidenced an intent to discriminate.359
Similarly, Forever 21 claimed that for approximately half of the goods
it imported, the rates on menswear were higher, and in the
remaining half, rates on womenswear were higher.360 It claimed that
this imposed a burden on the wearer of the goods based upon her
gender.361 It also submitted explanatory notes from a 1960 Tariff
349. Id. at 1357.
350. 718 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
351. Id. at 1372.
352. Id.
353. 594 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
354. Id. at 1356–57 (rejecting disparate impact as prima facie evidence of
discrimination in the tariff context because rates typically result from complex
international trade negotiations and concessions that aim to further United States
policy goals, not from concern over the characteristics of the final purchasers).
355. Id. at 1358.
356. Id.
357. See, e.g., Rack Room Shoes, 718 F.3d at 1373 (supplementing gender- and agebased discrimination charges with additional allegations in an effort to show
government intent to discriminate).
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 1373–74.
361. Id. at 1374.
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Classification Study, which described the age/gender based
classification system as “questionable.”362 Finally, Skiz Imports,
which had been specially created in order to bring an equal
protection claim, argued that it should have standing despite the
purpose of its existence.363
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Government’s argument that
Skiz lacked standing.364 As the court explained, the “requirements
for third-party standing” described in Totes require either (1) a “close
relationship” to a first party or (2) a “hindrance to the first party
filing its own claim.”365 The court determined that Skiz met neither
requirement, having no relationship “with a . . . consumer whose
rights it can . . . assert.”366 The court rejected Skiz’s alternative claim
that it had first-party standing, asserting that Skiz failed to prove an
injury that was “(a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”367 The court reasoned
that Skiz was simply a test case entity created solely to bring a claim.368
The court then proceeded to discuss Rack Room’s and Forever 21’s
claims, eventually affirming the CIT’s dismissal for failure by either to
state a claim.369 The court rejected Rack Room’s argument that
discriminatory intent may be inferred from Congress’s failure to use
“legitimate, available alternatives.”370 The court explained that the
inference that Rack Room asserted had its roots in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and was not applicable to Equal Protection Clause
challenges.371 It explained that the equal protection standard
includes a heightened requirement of disparate impact with a
“discriminatory purpose.”372 Further, the court explained that
failure to use alternative options did not prove discriminatory
purpose.373 In response to Rack Room’s arguments, the court
362. Id.
363. See id. at 1374–75 (arguing that its intention not to sell its products to third
party consumers did not deprive it of third-party standing and also claiming that it
had first party standing to bring an equal protection claim because paying allegedly
discriminatory customs duties itself constituted an injury in fact).
364. Id. at 1374–76.
365. Id. at 1375 (quoting Totes-Isotoner v. United States, 594 F.3d 1346, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2010)).
366. See id. (relying on Skiz’s admission that it did not intend to sell its imported
goods to consumers).
367. Id. (omission in original) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560 (1992)).
368. See id. (noting that “Skiz does not have a legally protected interest in not
paying tariffs” and thus has no concrete or particularized injury).
369. Id. at 1376–79.
370. Id. at 1376–77.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 1377 (citing Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).
373. Id.
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reaffirmed the Totes decision, which held that HTSUS was not
facially discriminatory in either its content or classification
headings.374 The court reasoned that HTSUS classifications “based
on the intended gender of [the] product’s user”375 most likely
showed that the products were made differently.376
Lastly, with regard to the studies that Forever 21 presented, the
court remained unpersuaded that the studies could allow an
inference of a discriminatory intent.377 The studies pertained to a
particular product—McKay-sewn leather footwear—and Forever 21
presented no additional evidence to support the proposition that the
statement would apply to other products classified in the HTSUS.378
The court felt that the same was true of portions of an 1892 treatise
concerning ‘slavery-related tariffs on wool clothing,’ which Forever 21
presented as evidence/to support its argument.379 Overall, the court
affirmed the CIT’s dismissal in part and, regarding Skiz, dismissed in
part due to lack of standing.380
The Federal Circuit in Wilton Industries v. United States381 addressed
the classification of paper punches and considered the issue under
which general heading certain types of paper punches should fall.382
Wilton imported paper punches from Taiwan, which Customs
classified under HTSUS subheading 8203.40.60 as “perforating
punches and similar hand tools.”383 Wilton argued that the items
should be classified under HTSUS subheading 8441.10.00 as “cutting
machines of all kinds.”384 In a stipulation agreement, Customs agreed
to reclassify the larger models as “cutting machines of all kinds”
because their size made it virtually impossible to use them as hand
tools; however, it classified the remaining models under the general

374. Id. at 1377–78.
375. Id. (noting the complexity of tariff negotiation processes and various other
possible non-discriminatory reasons for differing rates (citing Totes-Isotoner Corp. v.
United States, 594 F.3d 1346, 1355–59 (Fed. Cir. 2010))); see also Totes, 594 F.3d at
1359–60 (Prost, J., concurring) (observing that like tuxedos and evening gowns,
men’s and women’s gloves are different products but simply lack a distinguishing
name).
376. Rack Room, 718 F.3d at 1378 (citing Totes, 594 F.3d at 1357).
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 1378–79.
380. Id. at 1379.
381. 741 F.3d 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
382. Id. at 1265.
383. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
384. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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heading for “[t]ools, implements, [and] cutlery.”385 The CIT ruled in
favor of the Government and Wilton appealed.386
Applying the same GRI Rules that the CIT applied, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the CIT’s conclusion that the smaller Wilton
models should be classified under the HTSUS classification for
“perforating punches and similar hand tools.”387 The court
rejected Wilton’s argument that the items should be classified
prima facie as “cutting machines.”388
Applying GRI 1, the court afforded the section headings and
subheadings their plain meaning and determined that the
appropriate subheading for the machines was 8203.40.60, which falls
under the chapter on “[t]ools, implements, [and] cutlery,” rather
than 8441.10.00, which applies to “[n]uclear reactors, boilers, [and]
machinery.”389
The court rejected Wilton’s argument that
subheading 8203.40.60 was meant to exclude items that perforate
paper and should be limited to hand tools only.390 Relying on the
Explanatory Notes accompanying GRI 1, the court explained that the
classification included items used for perforating paper and “covers
tools which can be used independently in the hand.”391
Lastly, the court found that even if the items were not “prima facie
classifiable” under subheading 8203.40.60, GRI 3 would mandate
their classification under the more specific of the two subheadings—
in this case, subheading 8203.40.60.392
Furthermore, if no
appropriate classification existed under GRI 1-3, GRI 4 would require
the items’ classification under heading 8203.40.60 because it is “the
heading appropriate to the goods to which they are most akin.”393
Based on the above analysis, the court affirmed the CIT.394
III. RULES OF ORIGIN CASES
In Ford Motor Co. v. United States,395 the Federal Circuit considered
the application requirements for preferential treatment under the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which allows

385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.

Id. at 1265–66 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1265.
Id. at 1268 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1267–68.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1268.
Id.
Id.
Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 715 F.3d 906 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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“qualifying goods to enter into the United States duty free.”396 Those
seeking the preference may do so before importing or seek a refund
after the fact.397 Congress codified the procedures for seeking the
preference post-importation in 19 U.S.C. § 1520(d).398
The
requirements under § 1520(d) include written declarations, other
documentation, and a valid certificate of origin for the goods, which
must be filed within one year of importing.399 Late filing may result
in denial of preferential treatment, according to 19 C.F.R. § 181.23.400
Additionally, in certain circumstances, Customs may waive the
certificate of origin requirement as provided by § 181.22.401
Alongside NAFTA and the process for filing for preferential
treatment is the reconciliation program.402 The program involves an
online process meant to streamline importation where certain
documents may not exist at the time of importation.403 Customs
modified/amended the program on September 30, 1997, to
eliminate its certificate of origin requirement.404 This alteration took
effect on October 1, 1998.405
Ford Motor Company negotiated with many ports to develop the
electronic submission procedure for preferential treatment claims.406
It succeeded at most ports, except Detroit.407 Despite this failure to
reach an agreement with the port of Detroit, Ford timely submitted
over six hundred electronic claims during a period when it
mistakenly believed the electronic submissions had been
authorized.408 However, Customs denied Ford’s submissions to its

396. Id. at 908.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 908–09 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1520(d) (2012)).
399. 19 U.S.C. § 1520(d).
400. See Ford Motor Co., 715 F.3d at 909 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 181.23 (2013)).
401. See id. at 909–10 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 181.22(d)(1)).
402. See id. at 910–11 (outlining the reconciliation process and highlighting
sources on the program); Announcement of National Customs Automation Program
Test Regarding Reconciliation, 62 Fed. Reg. 5673 (Feb. 6, 1997) (initiating the
development of the reconciliation program, which, according to Ford Motor Co., 715
F.3d at 910, continued over the course of multiple notices published in the Federal
Register); see also U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL, AUTOMATED COMMERCIAL SYSTEM
(ACS) RECONCILIATION PROTOTYPE: A GUIDE TO COMPLIANCE, VERSION 4.0 (2004), available
at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/trade_programs/reconciliation
/reference_desk/acs_recon_guide.ctt/acs_recon_guide.pdf
(explaining
the
reconciliation process and including an appendix of applicable Federal Register notices).
403. Ford Motor Co., 715 F.3d at 910.
404. Modification of National Customs Automation Program Test Regarding
Reconciliation, 62 Fed. Reg. 51181, 51182 (Sept. 30, 1997).
405. Id. at 51181.
406. Ford Motor Co., 715 F.3d at 911.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 911–12.
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Detroit office.409 At first, the CIT refused to hear Ford’s appeal
regarding the denial, claiming that the court lacked the jurisdiction
to challenge Customs’ decision regarding the certificates of origin.410
The Federal Circuit overturned the CIT dismissal, holding that the
review could not be denied due to “formalities.”411 On remand, the
CIT ruled in favor of Customs, and Ford appealed that decision.412
In its second appeal, Ford argued that “[19 U.S.C.] § 1520(d)
[did] not expressly require [certificates of origin] to be filed
within one year” and that Customs must accept the late certificates
under 19 C.F.R. § 10.112.413 Section 10.112 predates NAFTA and
allows documents to be filed any time before liquidation if the
untimeliness was not “due to willful negligence or fraudulent
intent.”414
Ford also argued that Customs had waived the
documentation requirement as part of the reconciliation program
but not as part of the paper process, resulting in contradictory
applications of the same statutory provision.415
The court rejected Ford’s argument that the time limitation did
not apply to the certificates.416 The court found Ford’s argument
unpersuasive because the language of the statute was clear.417
Indeed, the statute states that the necessary documentation must be
filed “within 1 year after the date of importation.”418 Thus, the court
held that a request for refund may be denied if the required
documentation is not provided within the statutory timeframe.419
Based on the plain language of the statute, the court was also
unwilling to accept Ford’s position regarding § 10.112, finding that
the language of § 10.112 clearly indicated Congress’s intent to
require a one-year submission deadline.420 The court explained that
§ 10.112 cannot be used to “circumvent the clear mandate” of both
NAFTA and the statute.421
However, the court agreed with Ford’s argument regarding the
contrary interpretations of the waiver within the statute.422 In
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.

Id. at 912.
Id.
Id. (including failure to file a certificate of origin).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 914 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 10.112 (2013)).
Id. at 912, 915.
Id. at 914–15.
Id.
19 U.S.C. § 1520(d) (2012).
Ford Motor Co., 715 F.3d at 913.
Id. at 913–14.
Id. at 914.
Id. at 917.
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accordance with Dongbu Steel v. United States,423 Customs cannot
interpret the same statute in two different ways “[a]bsent a
reasonable explanation.”424 The court remanded the case so that
Customs could provide an explanation as to why a waiver was
provided in the reconciliation program while other waiver
procedures remained in the paper process.425
Judge Newman dissented, finding that § 10.112 should apply.426
Judge Newman asserted that § 10.112 came first, and absent clear
intent to remove the provision, there was no reason to interpret 19
U.S.C. § 1520(d) as being an exception to the general rules that 19
C.F.R. § 10.112 provided.427 Because there was no willful negligence
or fraudulent intent, the documents should have been accepted
despite their untimeliness.428 Judge Newman went on to cite the
audit reports of Ford’s post-entry claims as “noteworthy
accomplishment[s],” and noted the lack of consistency amongst the
ports themselves in providing statutory waivers.429
IV. PROCEDURAL CASES
Procedural cases address the practice elements of the cases
presented to the Federal Circuit. During the 2013 term, two
procedural cases stood out as important to the practice. One
examined the scope of power the USTR has to negotiate trade
agreements, and the other distinguished between shareholders and
corporations as importers of record for gross negligence actions.
The key aspect of Almond Bros. Lumber Co. v. United States430 was the
court’s confirmation of the USTR’s broad power to negotiate trade
agreements that he finds satisfactory despite objections by industry.431
The origin of the issue presented in this case can be traced back over
two decades to ongoing allegations that Canada had unfairly
subsidized production of softwood lumber at the expense of domestic

423. 635 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
424. Ford Motor Co., 715 F.3d at 915–16.
425. Id. at 917 (finding the record inadequate to explain why Customs applied
different interpretations of the statute when exercising its waiver authority).
426. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
427. Id. at 920.
428. See id. at 917–18 (highlighting that § 10.112 allows for the late filing of a
supporting document on the condition that the delay in filing the document was not
due to willful negligence or fraudulent intent).
429. Id. at 920–21.
430. 721 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
431. See id. at 1326–27 (finding that the negotiation of trade agreements was
committed to agency discretion and thus the USTR’s action was immune from
judicial review).
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U.S. producers.432 Beginning in 1986, the Coalition for Fair Lumber
Exports (“the Coalition”) filed a petition relating to Canada’s
subsidizing practices.433 This petition resulted in a memorandum of
understanding (1986 MOU) between Canada and the United
States;434 however, Canada terminated that MOU in 1991.435 After the
results of a countervailing duty investigation, a new settlement
agreement was reached with Canada (1996 Softwood Lumber
Agreement (SLA)).436 In the 1996 SLA, Canada agreed to impose an
export tax on softwood lumber, and the United States agreed to stop
the related duty investigation and dismiss prior petitions.437
The SLA expired in 2001 and Commerce and the Coalition sought
to again impose antidumping and countervailing duty orders.438 This
resulted in a renewed SLA with Canada (2006 SLA).439 The 2006 SLA
stipulated that the United States would revoke any outstanding
antidumping and countervailing duty orders and refund duties
Canada paid after March 22, 2002, in exchange for Canada’s
imposition of an export tax for seven years and distribution of $1
billion to various groups in the United States.440 Under the
distribution terms of the agreement, the Coalition was set to receive
half of the billion-dollar distribution.441
The appellants in this case were domestic softwood lumber
producers who were not members of the Coalition.442 The appellants
brought four counts against the United States and the USTR.443 The
CIT dismissed counts 2, 3, and 4 for failure to state a claim.444 Count
1 was dismissed separately.445 The appellants appealed the dismissal
of counts 2, 3 and 4.446
432. Id. at 1323.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 1323–24.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 1324.
443. Id. at 1324.
444. Id. at 1324–25. In count 2, the appellants alleged that the USTR exceeded its
statutory authority by agreeing to a distribution term that excluded some members of
the domestic softwood lumber industry. Id. In count 3, the appellants alleged that
the distribution term failed to provide equal protection for all members of the
industry. Id. In count 4, the appellants alleged that the USTR wrongfully allowed
the Coalition, a non-governmental entity, to determine how much each domestic
producer should receive. Id.
445. Id. at 1322.
446. Id. at 1325.
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The Federal Circuit sustained the dismissal of count 2, which stated
that the USTR exceeded his authority when he negotiated the 2006
SLA with Canada.447 Section 2411 provides the authority for the
USTR to enter into negotiations.448 Section 2411(c)(1)(D)(iii) in
particular provides the USTR with authority to set the distribution
terms or provide the United States with “compensatory trade
benefits.”449 The only statutory limitations placed on the USTR are
that the requirements of § 2411(c)(4) be met and that any negotiated
benefits be “satisfactory to the Trade Representative.”450 Given the
overly broad nature of the limitations, the court found that the
actions of the USTR were not reviewable in accordance with Heckler v.
Chaney,451 in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that there can be no
review of agency action where there is no law to apply.452 The USTR’s
actions were also unreviewable under Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe,453 in which the Court held that there can be no law to apply
where the statute’s terms are overly broad.454 Given that the USTR’s
decision was immune from review and that expertise lay with him on
the subject, the appellants could not then allege abuse of discretion
due to the USTR’s decision to exclude them from the distribution.455
Further, the USTR was not required to include every member of the
domestic lumber industry in the distribution terms, and final
discretion lay with the USTR on how best to distribute any fund
received from Canada in the negotiated agreement.456
The court then sustained the dismissal of count 3, which alleged
that the distribution terms violated equal protection principles by
excluding the appellants.457 The court applied rational basis scrutiny
to find that there was a “rationally related . . . legitimate government
purpose [aimed at] ending the undesirable trade practices of the
Canadian softwood lumber industry, and . . . settl[ing] the ongoing
litigation concerning the U.S.—Canadian softwood lumber trade.”458
Further, it was the Coalition who bore the bulk of the time and
expense in the lengthy litigation process that began in 1986.459 The
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.

Id.
Id. at 1326–27.
Id.
19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(D)(iii))(2012).
470 U.S. 821 (1985).
Almond Bros. Lumber Co., 721 F.3d at 1326–27 (citing Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830).
401 U.S. 402 (1971).
Almond Bros. Lumber Co., 721 F.3d at 1326 (citing Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410).
Id. at 1326–27.
Id. at 1327.
Id. at 1327–29.
Id. at 1328.
Id. at 1328–29.
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court stated that there was a rational basis for compensating the party
who had borne the most expense in reaching an agreement between
the U.S. and Canada.460
Finally, the dismissal of count 4 was also sustained.461 Count 4
alleged sub-delegation of authority to a private entity on the matter of
the distribution terms.462 Importantly, the court noted that the terms
and agreement were made by the USTR, not the Coalition.463
Further, the court held that the parties had no standing to object to
how the private party (Coalition) distributed the funds.464
In a case that was later vacated by the Federal Circuit, the court in
United States v. Trek Leather465 distinguished between shareholders and
corporations as importers of record for purposes of assessing damages
for gross negligence actions.466 Shadadpuri was the president and sole
shareholder of Trek Leather and a 40% shareholder of Mercantile
Electronics.467 Customs determined that both Trek and Mercantile
purchased “assists”468 and provided them to manufacturers outside the
United States.469 These “assists” were used to make men’s suits, which
were then imported back into the United States by Trek and
Mercantile.470 Trek and Mercantile failed to advise Customs of the
“assists”—therein lowering the duties owed on the imports.471
After an initial investigation in 2002, Mercantile admitted fault and
paid $46,156 in unpaid duties.472 After being confronted again about
these assists, Shadadpuri admitted that Trek should have included
the value of the assists in its duties as well.473 Customs brought
criminal actions against Trek and against Shadapuri in his personal
capacity, seeking damages of $2,392,307 for “fraudulently, knowingly,
and intentionally understating the dutiable value” of the items.474

460. Id. (finding that it was rational to favor the Coalition because it was largely
responsible for the agreement).
461. Id. at 1329.
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. 724 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013), petition for rehearing en banc granted and vacated
by 2014 WL 843527 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 5, 2014) (per curiam).
466. Id. at 1339–40.
467. Id. at 1331.
468. Id. at 1331–32 (defining “assists” as “materials, components, parts, and similar
items incorporated in the imported merchandise” (quoting 19 U.S.C.
§ 1401a(h)(1)(A)(i) (2012))).
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 1332.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. Id.
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Customs also sued Trek and Shadadpuri civilly for gross negligence
and negligence.475
In the CIT, Trek conceded to gross negligence.476 Shadadpuri,
meanwhile, denied all claims, arguing that he was merely an
officer, not the “importer of record,” and could not be held liable
unless the government pierced Trek’s corporate veil or found him
guilty of fraud or of aiding and abetting fraud.477 The CIT found
in favor of the Government on the gross negligence claims,
holding both Trek and Shadadpuri joint and severally liable for
$534,420.478 The CIT determined that the plain language of the
statute for assessing penalties did not make an exception for
“negligent corporate officers.”479 Shadadpuri appealed, again
arguing that corporate officers cannot be held liable for penalties
assessed solely due to negligence.480
The Federal Circuit agreed with the CIT that the term “person”
should be read broadly, but disagreed that the plain language of
the statute indicated that corporate officers could be held liable in
negligence.481 The court found that the CIT’s interpretation was
unreasonable “given [the] long-standing principles of limited
liability for shareholders and corporate officers when acting on
behalf of a corporation.”482
Reiterating United States v. Hitachi,483 the court explained that an
officer cannot be held liable for negligence because he cannot “aid
and abet” another’s negligence.484 The court reasoned that because
the “importer of record” is the only actor with an imposed duty
under the statute, only the “importer of record” can be held liable for
negligence, which is in accordance with the common law
understanding of negligence.485 The court also refused to undermine
common law principles of corporate law and rejected the
government’s contention that Shadadpuri should be held liable
because he was “actively involved with the funding and control of the
entry of merchandise.”486

475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.

Id.
Id. at 1333.
Id.
Id. at 1334.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1338–39.
Id. at 1337.
172 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Trek Leather, 724 F.3d at 1338.
Id.
Id. at 1339–40.
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By failing to prove Shadadpuri guilty of fraud or to pierce Trek’s
corporate veil, the Government’s claim against Shadadpuri had
devolved into a private claim against a corporate shareholder where
the Government had no standing.487 Thus, the court reversed the
CIT decision.488
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Dyk agreed with the CIT’s finding
that “person,” read broadly within the statute, included private
shareholders.489 Judge Dyk stated that this interpretation also
accorded with the legislative history predating the current statute
where officers were held liable.490 Citing legislative material, Judge
Dyk emphasized that the scope of the current language was not
meant to change those liable under the statute and that “[t]he
persons covered . . . [we]re intended to remain the same as they
[we]re under [the previous] law.”491 In agreement with the CIT,
Judge Dyk asserted that Shadadpuri could clearly be held liable for
negligence as a “person” under the statute.492

487. Id.
488. Id. at 1340.
489. Id. (Dyk, J., dissenting).
490. Id.
491. Id. at 1341–42.
492. Id. (noting that if the legislative history and plain language require the courts
to define “person” broadly within the statute, then Shadadpuri is not immune from
liability simply because he was not the “importer of record”).

